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INGOs in Afghanistan: Impact of Activities and Attributes on
Attack
Abstract
International NGOs (INGOs) operate in insecure environments where they provide lifesaving services to the world's neediest populations. This study examines the impact of
organizational attributes and activities on INGO vulnerability to insurgent attacks in
Afghanistan. The study operationalizes three organizational attributes: 1)sustainability,
measured by the organization’s longevity; 2)perceived independence from the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT), measured by whether the INGO operated in Afghanistan before or
after September 11, 2001; and 3)religiosity coded as secular, faith-inspired, or faith-based.
In addition, the study operationalizes three INGO activities: 1)type of gender-focused
activities and programs of each organization; 2)transformational advocacy, measured as
promoting democracy, women empowerment, or women’s rights in Afghanistan; and 3)level
of exposure to violence in Afghanistan, measured by the number of provinces in which the
organization operated. The study uses a matched sample design with a 1:2 ratio. Each
victim INGO is matched with two non-victim INGOs by year and province. Matching INGOs
on these two factors lessens the impact of structural and environmental factors, such as
insurgent control of territory, in the analysis. Binomial logistic regression identified one
organizational activity, level of exposure, and one organizational attribute, sustainability, as
predictors of attacks against INGOs.
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Introduction
Civil Society in Afghanistan
Civil society in Afghanistan is robust. Since its establishment in 1988, the
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development (ACBAR)
informs non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of government
regulations and serves as a liaison to the Afghan government. ACBAR lists
167 active NGOs, both national and international, in Afghanistan.1
Mitchell, whose research focuses on NGO activity in Afghanistan,
categorizes NGOs by years of operation, physical location (at the province
level), and sector activity from 2000 to 2014.2 Mitchell's publicly available
dataset confirms the presence of NGOs across all provinces and all sectors
of activity. To handle the extensive presence of humanitarian
organizations, the Afghan government created the Directorate of NonGovernmental Organizations, which registers, monitors, and coordinates
NGO activity.3
Despite the influx of aid and assistance, Afghanistan ranks poorly in
economic, political, and social health measures. As part of its assessment
of states’ political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House consistently
assigns the not free label to Afghanistan. The only exception to the
classification occurred between 2006 to 2008, when Freedom House
elevated Afghanistan’s designation to partly free. Additionally,
Afghanistan earned among the lowest scores of any country in 2001 and
2002.4 Transparency International assesses the perception of public sector
corruption. From 2007 to 2019, Afghanistan landed among the ten lowestranked countries. The only exception was 2020 when it improved to the
fifteenth worse position.5 The State Fragility Index measures the
effectiveness and legitimacy of governments on security, political,
economic, and social dimensions. From 2001 through 2018, Afghanistan
maintained a rating of high fragility.6 These low rankings result from the
many ills that plague the country, ranging from high poverty rates to
limited access to healthcare and education.
International NGOs address Afghan's economic, political, and social needs
in an environment marked by weak institutions and corrupt officials who
cannot protect the rights of its people, let alone provide for the security of
foreign aid workers. The Aid Worker Security Database lists 563 security
1
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incidents involving aid workers in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2020. 7
The Global Terrorism Database lists 16,163 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan
between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2019, which translates
into 12.62 percent of all attacks that occurred globally during that period.8
Fourteen terrorist groups currently operate in Afghanistan, according to
the CIA.9 In its 2020 Annual Report on civilian casualties, the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that civilian
casualties exceeded 3,000 for the seventh consecutive year, with a heavy
toll experienced by Afghan women and children.10 The report attributes 62
percent of civilian attacks to the Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant–Khorasan Province, and undetermined anti-government
elements.11
The surge of foreign military personnel into Afghanistan, from America’s
Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO's International Security Assistance
Force and Resolute Support Mission, and UNAMA intensified an already
complex aid arena. In addition, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) combined military and non-military personnel from multiple states
to transition control of Afghanistan back to the Afghan people. The fusing
of military and humanitarian missions and actors in Afghanistan fueled
the militarization of aid. Mitchell tested the blurred line theory, which
suggests attacks against civil society increase as attackers lose the ability to
distinguish between aid workers and combatants. Mitchell studied the
PRTs stationed in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2011 and concluded that
the blurred line theory does not explain increased attacks against aid
workers.12
In May 2019, the Taliban bombed the offices of Counterpoint
International because the INGO engaged in "harmful Western activities."13
The literature is rich with studies that highlight the anti-Western nature of
the Afghan insurgent ideology. For example, Cottee concludes that Jihadi
Salafism considers civilians part of the "Western infidel regimes,"
legitimizing them as targets.14 Other researchers compare the ideologies of
specific Afghan groups. For instance, Ibrahimi and Akbarzadeh found
similarities between the ideologies of the Taliban and Islamic StateKhorasan Province. Relatedly, Soherwordi, Ashraf, and Khattack conclude
that the ideologies of the Taliban and al Qa'ida coalesced over the years
with opposition to Western influence emerging as a commonality.15 Other
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researchers recognizing the anti-Western views among Afghan insurgents
include Terpstra, Raqib and Barreto, Payne, and Hassan.16
Civil society's response to Afghan’s crisis remains complicated due to the
vast needs of the people, the existence of foreign military forces, weak and
transitional government institutions, and a vigorous insurgency. In
addition, the continued attacks against international NGOs (as well as
national NGOs) demands inquiry into its causes. This author examines the
following research question: Are INGOs at greater risk of attack if the
organizations’ activities and attributes contradict the beliefs of Afghan
insurgents?

The Role of Ideology in Target Selection
Recognizing the actual motive of those who engage in violence is often
difficult, but knowing so is a prerequisite to classifying such incidents as
political. Public pronouncements by Afghan insurgent spokespersons can
provide insights into motive, but disentangling political from criminal
motives may be impossible. Insurgents may conceal or misrepresent their
true motive, or criminal and political motives may co-exist. While the
ideologies of the Taliban and other anti-government forces crept into the
public domain, the degree to which the group’s beliefs drove target
selection remained unclear.
Drake’s 1998 article explores the association between ideology and
terrorist target selection. Drake challenged the presumption that terrorism
was indiscriminate and maintained that target selection was more
methodical, with ideology playing a central role.17 Presented with a
multitude of targets, terrorists select those which confer the most
significant benefit. Ideology frames the environment and determines
which targets are legitimate from the terrorists’ perspective. Drake
explains that ideology "provides terrorists with the moral and political
vision that inspires their violence, shapes how they see the world, and
defines how they judge the actions of people and institutions. This in turn
forms their views as to who or what may be seen as a legitimate target."18
In a more recent article, Nacos concludes that ideology, though one of
several factors in target selection, remains the most important.19
Other scholars have expanded on Drake's work. For example, Hahn,
Tamborini, Novotny, Grall, and Klebig categorize terrorist groups by
3
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ideology and find that religious groups desire to eliminate socially corrupt
behavior from their environments.20 Many insurgent groups within
Afghanistan strive to retain what the researchers call purity within their
society.21 These researchers' conclusions are consistent with an earlier
work by Hoffman, who recognized that terrorists choose targets because of
a perceived reward for the selection.22
The works discussed above offer insight into the selection of international
NGOs as targets. Despite the literature on target selection, the reasons
terrorists select one INGO over another when both are near the attacker
remain unclear. Mccartan, Masselli, Rey, and Rusmak use the substitution
effect theory to explain that terrorists shift to a less secure target when
presented with a range of targets with varying security.23 Therefore, the
substitution effect explains why attackers target a specific INGO while
ignoring others operating in the same area. Other studies focus on
opportunity as an explanation for target choice. For example, Wasson and
Bluesteed contend that motivation and opportunity are central to terrorist
decision-making.24 Ahmed also found that perceptions of opportunity
drive target selection.25
It is common to examine target selection from the perspective of terrorists.
Polo takes an actor-level approach and argues that terrorists' strategic
desire to gain supporters and coerce the government drives target
selection.26 Taking an organizational approach is Katagiri, who suggests
that instability within the terrorist organization leads to more violence
against civilians.27 Several other scholars focus on the drivers behind
civilian versus non-civilian targets. For example, Abrahms, Ward, and
Kennedy suggest terrorists pursue both process and outcome goals. The
more mature the organization, the more likely the group pursues outcome
goals, which are the stated objectives of the terrorists. Process goals
include media coverage and other attention-seeking objectives gained
from the use of violence. Civilian attacks advance process goals more than
outcome goals but are risky for the less mature organizations that use this
type of attack.28 However, there are limitations to focusing on target
selection from the perspective of the terrorists. Shortland maintains that
such models presume to know what the terrorists think and what
information is available to them.29 According to Forest, researchers lack
sufficient knowledge of terrorist decision-making, leading them to
overstate ideology's influence on target selection.30
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The empirical study of ideology’s role in target selection from the
perspective of the terrorists or insurgents will remain elusive to
researchers. However, it is possible to provide insight into the role of
ideology by focusing on the targets that terrorists select. Information
about international NGOs is readily available to researchers. If the
ideology of terrorist organizations influences the choice of targets, then the
attributes and activities of international NGOs that contradict that
ideology would increase the vulnerability of such organizations to violent
attacks. The author operationalizes three attributes and three activities of
INGOs to assess whether INGOs whose activities contradict insurgent
ideology are at greater risk of attack.

Methodology
Data Description
The dataset for this article consists of 165 unique international NGOs that
operated in Afghanistan at some point between September 12, 2001, and
December 31, 2019. These INGOs differ in various ways, from size, scope
and type of activities, country of origin, and length of operations in
Afghanistan. The author developed the list of international NGOs, both
victim and non-victim, from the following sources:
•

•
•
•

Mitchell's Provincial Level Dataset, which spans 2000 to
2014 and includes the provinces and years in which the
INGO operated as well as the sectors in which the
organization conducted activities
Website of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of
Economy, Directorate of Non-Governmental Organizations
Member list of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan
Relief and Development (ACBAR)
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

This article uses a matched sample design with a 1:2 ratio. The design
yielded 55 victim organizations and 110 non-victims. The author matched
non-victim organizations to victim organizations by the year of attack
against the victim organization and the province where the attack
occurred. International non-governmental organizations appear only once
5
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in the matched sample. The author selected a random case for those
INGOs with multiple attacks in Afghanistan during the research
timeframe. A matched sample design mitigates the impact of
environmental and structural factors so that the effect of the variables
under study becomes easier to observe.
The literature suggests that an association exists between environmental
factors and target selection. Morris applies situational crime prevention
theory to terrorism and concludes that the environment drives the
attractiveness of a target, and knowing environmental information allows
for the hardening of attractive targets within vulnerable areas.31 In their
article on terrorism within the United Kingdom, Marchment and Gill
developed an acronym, TRACK, which suggests that targets are attractive
when Tolerable, Relevant, Accessible, Close or Known. Admitting that
such a method may yield many potential targets, the researchers conclude
that the one selected may be the least risky or most convenient.32
Hoffman's dissertation focuses on the impact of territorial control on
target selection. Focusing on Iraq, Hoffman concluded the target varied by
whether insurgents controlled the territory.33 Similarly, Onat and Gul
conclude in their article that focuses on Istanbul, Turkey, that
environmental factors can predict terrorism at the micro-level.34 A
matched sample design mitigates structural and environmental factors
such as insurgent control of territory, overall threat environment, level of
violence, and regulations imposed on INGOs by the government or
insurgents. Therefore, non-victim organizations operate under the same
conditions as the matched victim, allowing the analysis to focus on
organizational attributes and activities as predictors of victimization.
Operationalization of Variables
Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables relied on
International NGO websites, documents, and publications such as annual
reports and press releases. The Wayback Machine, a digital archive of
websites, allows users to view websites, even those taken down or
discontinued, as they existed at various points in time.35 Event date refers
to the attack year for victim organizations. The dependent variable is
dichotomous, with each INGO classified as a victim or non-victim. The
author used the GTD to determine victim status for each organization.
Violent attacks against organizations' personnel, property, or assets
resulted in classification as a victim organization. The author conducted
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additional research for all non-victim organizations to confirm that status.
Classification as a non-victim signifies the organization did not suffer an
attack in Afghanistan between September 12, 2001, and December 31,
2019. However, the non-victim INGO may have experienced other security
incidents, such as harassment in Afghanistan or suffered a violent attack
in another country. In a 2007 article, Fast distinguished between ambient
and situational insecurity, with the former referring to a general condition
of violence in a region and the latter referring to an act of violence against
an NGO arising from a particular situation.36 According to Fast, an aid
worker killed in a crossfire is the victim of ambient insecurity, while the
murder of an aid worker due to an affiliation with an INGO is a victim of
situational insecurity. This research classified INGOs as victims if
situational insecurity contributed to an attack on the organizations'
personnel, property, or assets.
Sustainability
International non-governmental organizations respond to disasters and
conflicts and must demonstrate resilience and sustainability to remain
operational.37 Resilient organizations operate in such environments over
long periods, gaining valuable experience navigating government
regulations and insurgent restrictions depending on which actor controls
the territory in which the organization operates. International nongovernmental organizations also confront security challenges in their
environments. For example, the GTD lists forty-three attacks (seven in
Afghanistan) against various International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent (IFRC) elements between 2001 and 2019.38 Resilient
organizations such as the IFRC have learned to adapt to harsh settings,
adopting appropriate security protocols for the situation. Mathews and
Lowenberg studied the impact of security measures on the selection of
targets by terrorists.39 The researchers concluded that the existence of
security protocols decreases that target’s chance of selection but increases
the likelihood of selection for another target. The displacement theory
suggests that international NGOs are resilient because varied and broad
experiences lead the organizations to adopt effective security protocols,
which preserves longevity.
In this article, sustainability refers to an organization's ability to carry out
its mission over time. The author calculated the sustainability value using
7
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the years from the INGO's founding until the event year. International
non-governmental organizations with low sustainability existed from 1 to
12 years before the event date, INGOs with moderate sustainability
operated from 13 to 24 years before the event date, and INGOs with high
sustainability operated for over 25 years. The author hypothesizes that
higher levels of sustainability will lead to fewer attacks, as experiences in
conflict and disaster zones heighten organizational resilience.
Religiosity
The literature addresses the contribution of faith-based organizations to
development.40 Much of the research on faith-based organizations is
normative, focusing on issues of trustworthiness and spiritual influence.
The association between INGO religiosity and security in conflict zones
remains a neglected area of research. The literature discusses the ethical
issues surrounding proselytism, which occasionally emerges as the motive
for insurgent attacks against faith-based organizations.41 Examples include
the August 2010 killing of the International Assistance Mission medical
team and the October 2008 murder of Gayle Williams, an aid worker with
SERVE, a Christian INGO.42 The literature discusses the differences and
oftentimes confusion between proselytism and evangelism, but perhaps
such a distinction may not matter to Afghan insurgents, who may view
both as a threat to their ideology.43
The author coded religiosity at the ordinal level: Secular, faith-inspired, or
faith-based. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are self-identified and
participate in alliances and networks for faith-based NGOs. Faith-inspired
NGOs, founded on faith or guided by faith, do not serve as instruments of
religious institutions or self-identify as instruments of religion.44 The
author hypothesizes that INGOs with higher levels of religiosity will have a
greater risk of attack than those with lower religiosity levels.
Perceived Organizational Independence from the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT)
The final variable in the attribute category measures whether insurgents
perceive an INGO as independent of the GWOT. By examining several
attacks that occurred in Afghanistan, it becomes apparent that insurgents
perceived at least some humanitarian organizations as agents of foreign
governments. For example, in August 2008, the Taliban accused three
8
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International Rescue Committee aid workers of conspiring against the
interests of Afghanistan. After labeling them as spies, the Taliban killed
the three aid workers.45 Another example is the June 2004 murder of five
employees of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières. The
Taliban justified its attack by explaining that “organisations like Médecins
Sans Frontières work for American interests and are therefore targets for
us.”46 The literature explores the conditions that create such perceptions
among terrorists. For example, the editors at Forced Migration Review
referred to the blurring of lines among the various actors in Iraq in 2003.
The editors concluded that the “2003 arrival en masse of NGOs reinforced
the popular perception that NGOs [were] inextricably linked to the
Coalition Forces.”47 Shannon conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2006
and concluded that the intermixing of military and humanitarian actors in
PRTs undermined the work of NGOs.48 Mitchell also looked at the impact
of PRTs on NGO security in Afghanistan and found that non-United
States’ led PRTs predicted security incidents while those PRTs led by the
United States did not.49
The author coded INGOs into a dichotomous variable, reflecting whether
the organization operated in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001. The
author hypothesizes that INGOs that operated in Afghanistan before the
GWOT are less likely perceived as agents of foreign state actors and,
therefore, less likely to suffer attacks by insurgents than INGOs that
entered Afghanistan post-September 11, 2001. Insurgents are more likely
to perceive organizations that entered Afghanistan post-September 11,
2001, as agents of the occupying forces.
Gender-focused Activities
The literature on gender and Afghanistan is extensive.50 Ahmed-Ghosh
provides a historical overview of the status of women in Afghanistan and
rejects the use of the pre-Taliban and post-Taliban framework to research
Afghan women. Instead, Ahmed-Ghosh takes a much broader view and
examines the rise and fall of 20th-century Afghan regimes within the
context of liberal gender policies that provoked politically violent
responses. The researcher comments that “the period from 1992-1996 saw
unprecedented barbarism by the Mujahideen where stories of killings,
rapes, amputations, and other forms of violence were told daily.”51 The
researcher suggests improving the status of women in Afghanistan within
9
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the context of households rather than removing them from their
traditional space.52
Bahri suggests that INGOs' efforts to promote gender equality in
Afghanistan fail because Afghan men are not part of the process. Failure to
involve men in the programs and activities calculated to improve the
welfare of women provoke opposition in the former.53 However, Beath,
Fotini, and Enikolopov examined the impact of a development program
implemented in 500 Afghan villages that mandated the participation of
women. These researchers maintained that such programs increased the
involvement of women in the community and positively influenced the
attitudes of both men and women. However, the researchers found that
the program did not affect the role of women within the family or the
attitudes about women's role in the broader society.54 In a later article,
Huber laments the lack of research that addresses terrorist groups'
reaction to gender equality. However, the researcher concludes that as
gender equality increases in a society, attacks against civilian targets,
including INGOs, decrease relative to attacks against government
targets.55
The author coded the gender-based activities and programs of
international NGOs into three categories. First, professional enrichment
INGOs provide vocational training or micro-financing for women's
businesses. Second, personal enrichment INGOs provide training to
women on healthcare, nutrition, hygiene, or literacy. Third, familycommunity enrichment INGOs include services and aid to widows or
families, infrastructure projects, or children’s programs. The author
hypothesizes that INGOs that engage in professional enrichment programs
are at greater risk of attack than INGOs that do not engage in such
programs and activities.
Transformational Advocacy
Many international NGOs engage in advocacy. However, few studies seek
to operationalize the concept and subject it to empirical analysis.56 Murdie
and Stapley focus on how advocacy efforts impact NGO security. The
researchers conclude that NGOs that try to advance human rights within a
country will invite terrorist hostility. As a result, the researchers found that
the higher the number of advocacy NGOs that exist in a country, the more
likely terrorism will strike the NGO sector as the terrorist groups see the
10
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss3/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.3.2012

Lambert: INGOs in Afghanistan

work of the NGO as politically threatening.57 Additionally, Hudson found
that high levels of international consensus on an issue equated to more
advocacy effort. These two articles explain the attractiveness of
Afghanistan to advocacy INGOs as well as insurgent violence against such
organizations.
The author operationalizes transformational advocacy as INGOs that seek
to empower women, enhance women's rights, or promote democracy in
Afghanistan. Examples of INGOs engaged in transformational advocacy in
Afghanistan include Democracy International, Canadian Women for
Women in Afghanistan, and Marie Stopes International. The Wayback
Machine provided access to websites and documents during the event
year, allowing for an assessment of advocacy efforts. The transformational
advocacy variable differs from the gender-focused variable because it
categorizes INGOs based on whether the organization actively seeks to
alter national or international laws or policies that empower women or
promote women's rights or democracy in Afghanistan. In contrast, the
gender-focused variable categorizes INGOs by the type of program or
activity implemented within Afghan communities. Transformational
advocacy publicly promotes a new vision for Afghanistan that contradicts
the insurgents' beliefs. Therefore, the author hypothesizes that
engagement in transformational advocacy increases the likelihood of an
attack against such INGOs.
Level of Exposure to Attack
The scope of an INGO’s presence in Afghanistan represents its level of
exposure to an attack. International non-governmental organizations that
operate in multiple provinces may increase the risk of attack for several
reasons. The more areas in which an organization operates, the more
opportunities for insurgents to attack that INGO. The more provinces in
which the INGO delivers programs and activities, the more familiar the
organization’s name is to insurgents, which may increase its chances of
landing on a target list. Finally, broad-based operations suggest a broad
impact on society, translating into a more significant threat to the
insurgents' beliefs.
The level of exposure to attack reflects the number of Afghan provinces in
which an international NGO operated during the event year. International
non-governmental organizations with a low level of exposure operated in
11
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one or two provinces during the event year, those with a moderate level of
exposure operated in three to nine provinces, and those with a high level of
exposure operated in over ten provinces during the event year. The author
hypothesizes that INGOs with a high level of exposure during the event
year will experience more attacks than INGOs with low or moderate levels
of exposure.

Logistic Regression Results
The author performed binomial logistic regression to ascertain the effects
of organizational activities and attributes on the likelihood of an attack
against international NGOs in Afghanistan.58 Multicollinearity test results
reveal that the Variance Inflation Factor for all six independent variables
was below 5, the Tolerance Levels were all above .20, and the Condition
Indices were below 15, indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue.
In addition, SPSS Casewise List identified three outliers with residuals
greater than two. However, the analysis includes the three cases, as the
author believes that natural variation in the data caused the outlier status.
The logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(10) = 27.891,
p = .002. The model explained 21.6 percent (Negelkerke R2) of the
variance in INGO victimization and correctly classified 72.1 percent of
cases. The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test suggests the model
is a good fit to the data as p=.080 (> .05).59 Sensitivity was 38.2 percent,
specificity was 89.1 percent, positive predictive value was 63.6 percent,
and negative predictive value was 74.2 percent. As shown in Table 1, only
two of the six predictor variables were statistically significant: Level of
exposure to attacks and sustainability. The odds of victimization decrease
for INGOs with low sustainability and low exposure to attacks. In other
words, INGOs that operated in only one or two provinces and existed for
twelve years or less during the event year experienced decreased
victimization.

Table 1. Logistic Regression Results
Variable
Religiosity
Faith-Inspired
Secular
Sustainability

B

SE

Wald

Df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

.431
-.384

.801
.470

1.564
.289
.665
8.002

2
1
1
2

.458
.591
.415
.018

1.538
.681

.320
.271

7.396
1.713
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Low Sustainability
Moderate
Sustainability
Level of Exposure
Low Exposure
Moderate Exposure
Enrichment
Personal
Enrichment
Professional
Enrichment
Transformational
Advocacy
Independence
Constant

-1.735
-.423

.613
.406

8.000
1.081

1
1

.005
.299

2
1
1
2
1

.024
.008
.025
.220
.137

.176
.655

.053
.295

.587
1.454

.220
.333

.071
.127

.678
.873

2.623

.736

9.354

-1.514
-1.099

.574
.492

.964

.649

7.435
6.953
4.999
3.025
2.211

.591

.410

2.083

1

.149

1.807

.809

4.033

-.451

.418

1.167

1

.280

.637

.281

1.444

.297
.616

.393
.702

.573
.771

1
1

.449
.380

1.346
1.852

.623

2.908

Notes: Variable(s) entered on step 1: Religiosity, Sustainability, Level of
Exposure, Enrichment, Advocacy, Independence. Ninety-five percent C.I.
for Exp(B). Source: Author.

The author also evaluated the model using the receiver operating
characteristic curve (ROC), which provides a metric of 0 to 1, with high
values showing good predictive performance. The area under the ROC
curve was .918, 95 percent CI [.876, .961], which is an outstanding level of
discrimination according to Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant.60 In the
ROC curve, the author plotted the classification of INGOs as victim or
non-victim using a 0.5 cut-off rate, as shown in the 45-degree line in
Figure 1. The author classified the organization as a victim if the
probability of victimization was greater than or equal to 0.5. The author
classified the organization as non-victim if the probability of victimization
was less than 0.5.
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Figure 1. Receiving Operating Characteristic Curve

Source: Author
Figure 1 serves as a visual display of the trade-off between false positives
and false negatives, as the threshold is varied. The article's results could
assist INGO stakeholders in assessing their organization’s vulnerability to
attack in Afghanistan. International non-governmental organizations
misclassified as non-victims could lead organizations to misjudge threats
and miscalculate risks resulting in personnel death and property
destruction. On the other hand, INGOs misclassified as victims could lead
such organizations to adopt unnecessary security measures. Not to
minimize financial constraints placed on INGOs by donors, small budgets,
or grantees, but it seems reasonable to select a cut-off rate that would
reduce false negatives as the consequences for an international NGO over
calculating its risk are preferable to the consequences for an organization
that under calculates its risk.

Conclusion
The author examines the role of organizational attributes and activities in
predicting attacks against international NGOs in Afghanistan between
2001 and 2019. The author operationalizes three activity variables:
•

Type of gender-focused activities of the INGO
14
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•
•

Whether the organization engaged in transformational advocacy
Level of exposure to attacks

The author also operationalizes three organizational attributes:
•
•
•

The religiosity of the INGO
Sustainability
Perceived independence from the GWOT

Only two of the six independent variables proved significant in the
model—level of exposure to attacks (an organizational activity) and
sustainability (an organizational attribute).
Limitations
Two limitations of the research merit discussion. First, the author matched
victim and non-victim cases at the province level. Matching victims and
non-victims at the district level may provide additional insights, as the
match may be more precise than that found at the province level. Second,
the use of proxy variables invites a discussion of validity. The author used
two proxy variables: Sustainability and perceived organizational
independence from the GWOT. International non-governmental
organizations classified as independent from the GWOT arrived in
Afghanistan before September 11, 2001, while the remaining INGOs
arrived post-September 11, 2001. International non-governmental
organizations that arrived in Afghanistan post-September 11 should have
higher rates of attack if that arrival date influenced the insurgents'
perception of the INGO as an agent of a foreign power. However, the
comingling of military and humanitarian actors in Afghanistan, as seen in
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, may alter insurgents' perception of
participating INGOs, regardless of the organizations’ arrival date. The
author measured the second proxy variable, INGO sustainability, by
calculating the time between the INGOs’ founding and the event date. Two
of the longest serving INGOs in Afghanistan, Save the Children and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, appear multiple times in the
GTD as victims of terrorism, suggesting that length of service may not
afford organizations protection from attack.
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Organizational Attributes
Sustainability, an organizational attribute, emerged as a significant
predictor in the model, but in the opposite direction than hypothesized.
The security protocols of long-standing INGOs with vast experience in
crisis zones are likely to be more effective than those of newer
organizations. However, the longevity of INGOs is negatively correlated
with attack status. In other words, the INGOs in operation the longest
were more likely to suffer attacks. Insurgents attacked 12 percent of
INGOs with low sustainability, 35 percent with moderate sustainability,
and 46 percent with high sustainability. Thus, the longevity of operations
increases INGO's likelihood of an attack, suggesting that it may be a poor
proxy for sustainability. Nevertheless, IGNOs can adopt security protocols
knowing that longevity increases vulnerability to attack even without
knowing why.
The organizational attribute, religiosity, did not prove significant in the
model. While there are examples of Afghan insurgents attacking INGOs
due to religiosity, it does not appear to be a driving factor in the selection
of targets. Ferris suggests that the Islamic world sees religion as the basis
for all humanitarian action so that Afghan insurgents may not distinguish
between faith-based organizations and secular ones in the same sense as
the West.61 However, Ferris' point extends only to motivation and not the
behavior of the organizations. Insurgents clearly differentiate between
organizations that proselytize and those that do not with the former often
inviting a violent response from the insurgents.
The third organizational attribute, perceived independence from the
GWOT, did not prove significant in the model. As discussed in the
limitations section, the GWOT variable is a proxy for organizational
independence from foreign military and state actors. The author found no
evidence that the likelihood of attack differed for organizations that
arrived in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001, compared to those that
arrived after September 11, 2001. Such a result does not necessarily
contradict the editors at Forced Migration Review, who believe the mass
arrival of INGOs in Iraq created the perception of alignment between the
organizations and Coalition Forces.62 The author can only conclude that
INGOs that operated in Afghanistan before the GWOT reaped no
advantage in security over those that arrived during the GWOT.
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Organizational Activities
International non-governmental organizations’ level of exposure to attacks
in Afghanistan proved significant in the model. The broader the base of
INGO operations, measured by the number of provinces in which the
INGO operated, the greater the likelihood of attack. Only 21 percent of
victim INGOs with a low exposure suffered an attack, while 35 percent
with moderate exposure and 47 percent with high exposure did so. The
finding supports the hypothesis that insurgents may perceive widespread
operations as a more significant threat to their ideological goals.
International non-governmental organizations in the victim category with
high exposure include several well-known organizations, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and
Halo Trust. The degree to which insurgent groups communicate across
provinces is unknown, so name recognition's impact on these results
remains unclear. In addition, the variable only measures the extent of the
organization’s level of exposure. The variable does not capture the number
of personnel assigned to the country or the volume of physical assets in
Afghanistan. The more personnel and assets within the country, the more
likely that insurgents might target such organizations to reap some
financial gain from ransom or the sale of seized assets.
The two other organizational activities, gender-focused programs and
transformational advocacy, do not explain attacks against INGOs in
Afghanistan. The results show that 31 percent of the INGOs engaged in
advocacy to empower women, enhance their rights, or promote
democracy, but the author found no evidence to support the notion that
Afghan insurgents target these INGOs more than those that do not engage
in the activity.63 The author also concludes that the type of gender-focused
activities and programs of INGOs does not predict violent attacks.
Interestingly, 52 percent of all the INGOs in the sample participated in
professional enrichment activities, including micro-financing for womenowned businesses and vocational training. However, the attack rate varied
little among the three categories: 36 percent for professional enrichment
INGOs, 37 percent for personal enrichment INGOs, and 28 percent for
family-community enrichment INGOs. The personal and professional
enrichment INGOs shared a similar attack rate, perhaps because both
types of organizations offer women-centric programs, though the nature of
the programs fundamentally differs, as described in the methodology
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 3

section. Nevertheless, the attack rate for both is slightly higher than that
for the non-women-centric or family-community enrichment INGOs.
Implications
The article contributes to the literature that explores terrorism's threat to
civil society. The results provide some support for the notion that ideology
drives terrorist selection of targets. Anecdotal evidence shows that
religiosity, gender-based activities, and advocacy efforts lead to some
INGO attacks. The level of exposure to attack in Afghanistan (an
organizational activity) and sustainability (an organizational attribute)
emerge as the best predictors of insurgent attacks. Long-standing
organizations that conduct widespread activities face the greatest risk of
attack. Future studies will continue to shed light on the risks to INGOs as
well as reveal sources of organizational vulnerability to political violence.
Knowledge of the threat environment allows for the proper alignment of
resources to security needs. While most organizations and businesses
intend to use funds effectively and efficiently, INGOs navigate a more
complex decision-making environment where donor and grant restrictions
impact the allocation of funds. International NGOs with a better
understanding of the drivers of insurgent target selection can more
effectively protect personnel, property, and assets from violent attacks.
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